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TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MAINE
Michael Walker*
ABSTRACT
Tax Increment Financing ("TIF") is a statutorily authorized mechanism which
enables municipalities to earmark the property tax revenue from designated areas to
pay for things such as infrastructure improvement. Lately, Maine municipalities
have been using TIF to refund tax revenues directly to private developers in an effort
to attract new business. This Comment will begin by briefly explaining the
development of TIF in the United States and how it has evolved over time. It will
then summarize how TIF works in Maine and the criticism and praise it has received
throughout its existence. Next, it will look at research examining the efficacy of TIF
around the country and in Maine. This Comment will argue that (1) TIF should be
used for infrastructure improvements and job training, not to reimburse developers;
(2) the maximum time limit for a TIF agreement should be lowered from thirty years
to twenty years; (3) the state should limit the use of TIF to mitigate the impact it has
on surrounding communities; and (4) the state should set job standards for business
that benefit from TIF. Finally, this Comment will end by suggesting strategies for
small Maine towns to make the most of TIF as it currently exists.
I. INTRODUCTION
Littleton is a small hypothetical town located somewhere in the western foothills
of Maine. Like many towns in Maine, Littleton has been economically stagnant since
the last local mill closed in the late 1980s and has seen almost no new development
or job growth in the past twenty-five years. Most residents must commute some
distance to find work, and although their property values are depressed, their
property taxes continue to increase each year as the town struggles to maintain its
aging infrastructure and contribute its share of the school budget.
Recently, a BigMart company representative contacted Littleton’s board of
selectmen and expressed interest in building a large retail store in the town. The
store, the representative claimed, would create about eighty new jobs and draw
customers from all over the surrounding area to Littleton. BigMart has already found
a suitable vacant lot, but has indicated that in order to proceed with the project, it
will need the property placed in a tax increment financing (“TIF”) district for a period
of thirty years. Under this arrangement, Littleton would return 85% of the property
taxes it collects from the BigMart shopping center to BigMart for thirty years to
offset the development costs, and use the remaining 15% to fund an economic
development program aimed at attracting more businesses.
News of BigMart’s interest has spread fast, and many townspeople have
contacted the selectmen to express their excitement and support. The selectmen,
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018. The author would like to thank
the members of the Maine Law Review, past and present, who offered their thoughtful input and
suggestions during the creation of this Comment. The author would also like to thank his family members
for their support and willingness to discuss, ad nauseam, the mechanics of tax increment financing.
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however, are concerned that the arrangement is too generous to BigMart. But when
they inquire with the company representative about more favorable terms, the
representative makes it very clear that BigMart will go to a neighboring town with
the same deal if the proposed TIF arrangement is not approved as quickly as possible.
Faced with pressure from their constituents and almost no bargaining power, the
Littleton selectmen must make a decision that will affect their town for thirty years.
They face questions the answers to which they can only guess. Will the benefit from
the TIF outweigh the negative aspects? What will the impact of the TIF be on the
school budget? Will the TIF be difficult to administer? In all likelihood, despite this
lack of information, they will vote to approve the TIF with the hope that they are
making some progress in reinvigorating their stagnant local economy.
This Comment will explain how Littleton came to be faced with such a decision.
It will start by briefly explaining the development of municipal tax increment
financing in the United States and how it has evolved over time. It will then
summarize how TIF works in Maine and the criticism and praise that it has received
throughout its existence. Next, this Comment will look at research examining the
efficacy of TIF both around the country and in Maine. It will argue that (1) TIF
should be used for infrastructure improvements and job training, not to reimburse
developers; (2) the maximum time limit for a TIF agreement should be lowered from
thirty years to twenty years; (3) the state should limit the use of TIF to mitigate the
impact it has on surrounding communities; and (4) the state should set job standards
for business that benefit from TIF. Finally, the Comment will end by providing
suggestions for small towns and briefly examining the future outlook of targeted
economic development programs in Maine and across the country. The overarching
argument of this Comment is that TIF has advantages and disadvantages, but reform
is needed to ensure that the benefits of such programs outweigh the costs.
II. TIF GENERALLY
Before discussing TIF in Maine, it is important to understand the evolution of
the program from one designed to fund urban renewal into a general purpose
economic development tool. This section will explain the basic origins of TIF and
how it works in the typical municipal property tax system. It will go on to explain
how the concept of blight impacts TIF arrangements and how changing blight
standards have signaled a shift in the use of such programs.
A. The Theory Behind TIF and Its Basic Structure
Tax increment financing, in theory, is a mechanism which “allows local
governments to freeze” the property tax value on a particular area, known as a TIF
district, and specifically earmark any subsequent increase in value and tax revenue
“to pay for infrastructure, remediate blight, and make other improvements” within
the district.1 At its most basic level, TIF is a tool that municipalities use to encourage
economic growth by incentivizing developers to build in certain underperforming

1
Phillip J.F. Geheb, Tax Increment Financing Bonds as “Debt” Under State Constitutional Debt
Limitations, 41 URB. LAW. 725, 725 (2009).
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areas that they would otherwise probably avoid. 2 Municipalities approve TIF
arrangements with the hope that the development or redevelopment will increase
property values and benefit the public.3
TIF began in the mid-twentieth century as part of an effort to revitalize blighted
urban areas.4 California developed tax increment financing in 1952 as a means of
providing matching funding for federal urban renewal grants. 5 But it was not until
the late 1970s, when federal funding for urban renewal began to dry up, that TIF
really began to take off as an alternative method for economic development. 6 In
1970, only seven states authorized TIF, but “twenty-eight states approved TIF by
1984, thirty-three by 1987, and forty-four by 1992. By the early 1990s, 56 percent
of cities with populations over 100,000 had used TIF. [By 2010], every state but
Arizona authorize[d] TIF.”7 According to Columbia Law School Professor Richard
Briffault, tax increment financing has become “the most widely used local
government program for financing economic development in the United States.” 8
To understand TIF, it is important to understand the basic model of property
taxation used by most states: ad valorem taxation.9 Ad valorem taxation is a system
in which property taxes are assessed based on property values. 10 Properties are
appraised and their combined values make up the total assessed value for a specific
jurisdiction.11 Then, the total budget for a jurisdiction for a given tax year is divided
by the total assessed value to determine a mill rate, which is often called a tax rate. 12
“Each mill produc[es] $1 of property tax for every $1,000 of assessed value”;
therefore, to calculate the taxes owed by the owner of each parcel, the assessed values
are multiplied by the mill rate.13
Professor Briffault expertly summarizes how TIF generally works within the ad
valorem taxation system:
TIF laws vary from state to state, but the basic idea is straightforward. A territorial
district is created within a city, and the assessed valuation of the property within the
district—known as the base value—is determined. Property taxes continue to be
levied, and the revenues generated by applying the tax rate to the base value continue
to be paid to the local governments—including the municipality, county, school
district, fire district, park district, and any other special districts—entitled to receive
them. But revenues generated from applying the property tax to any increased
property value within the district are, for the life of the district, set aside and paid to
2

Id. at 727.
Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing and Economically Motivated
Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 162 (1998).
4
Alyson Tomme, Note, Tax Increment Financing: Public Use or Private Abuse?, 90 MINN. L. REV.
213, 218 (2005).
5
Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of
Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 69 (2010).
6
Tomme, supra note 4, at 218-19.
7
Briffault, supra note 5, at 69-70.
8
Id. at 65.
9
H. Lawrence Hoyt, What’s the “TIF” All About?, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 5, 5 (David Callies
& Andrew Gowder, Jr. eds., 2012).
10
Id. at 5-6.
11
Id. at 6.
12
Id. at 7.
13
Id.
3
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the municipality or an economic development agency (which typically is controlled
by the municipality) to be used for public improvements and other economic
development programs within the district. These expenditures may be made, as the
incremental revenues are received, on a pay-as-you-go basis. More commonly for
larger TIF districts, the district may issue bonds backed by the projected incremental
revenues. The bond proceeds are then used to make major public investments
upfront, thus jumpstarting the development process.14

B. How TIF Has Changed from Its Original Purpose
The vast majority of states included blight as a requirement in their original TIF
legislation.15 Some states also allowed for TIF in areas that were at risk of becoming
blighted or in industrially zoned areas in need of development. 16 Blight, although
often left ambiguous by statutes, has been described as “conditions which endanger
public health or welfare such as overcrowding, dilapidated or deteriorating buildings,
or faulty street layout.”17 The blight requirement “relates to the basic nature of TIF
as a tool for redevelopment” and “[a] finding of blight in an area creates the link
between the activities of private developers and the public purpose necessary for
government to . . . fund a project using tax revenues.” 18
The notion of blight stemmed originally from federally funded low income
housing programs, which, before TIF and other incentive programs, was the only
way a community could “engage in redevelopment.”19 To qualify for federal funding
for new projects, communities “had to furnish a ‘workable program’ including a
redevelopment plan for dealing with slums and blight.” 20 This public interest
standard was further “expanded to include private development of areas before they
reached a point of disrepair that required widespread condemnation.” 21
Although when TIF began it was intrinsically tied with urban redevelopment
and blight, it has now mostly morphed into a general purpose economic development
tool. In most states, blight has become a less meaningful prerequisite for the use of
TIF, either through statutory changes that relax the requirement22 or through court
decisions that have interpreted blight broadly. 23 This has caused some controversy,
particularly when previously undeveloped areas are placed into TIF districts, leading
to so-called greenfield development.24
Such development, critics argue,
“undermines the usefulness of TIF to the older, poorer neighborhoods which were
the original focus of TIF. If every locality can offer an incentive, then the advantages
14

Briffault, supra note 5, at 67-68.
Alyssa Talanker & Kate Davis, Straying From Good Intentions: How States are Weakening
Enterprise Zone and Tax Increment Financing, Good Jobs First, 3 (2003).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 4.
18
CRAIG L. JOHNSON & KENNETH A. KRIZ, A REVIEW OF STATE TAX INCREMENT FINANCING LAWS, in
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 37 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds.,
2001).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See Talanker, supra note 15, at 37-38.
23
See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 18, at 38.
24
See Briffault, supra note 5, at 91.
15
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of undeveloped sites over poor urban areas are not offset by government subsidies.” 25
III. TIF IN MAINE
A. Development of TIF in Maine
Maine’s first TIF laws were passed in 1977 by the 108th Legislature.26 Although it
is beyond the scope of this Comment to do a complete legislative history, it is worth
noting that there have been dozens of revisions to Maine’s TIF laws since. Like TIF in
other parts of the country, Maine’s TIF laws have evolved away from the blight standard.
For example, the legislative findings from 1977 state: “It is found that there is a need for
a new development in areas of municipalities which are already built up, to provide new
employment opportunities, to improve and broaden the tax base and to improve the
general economy of the State.”27 The development districts were required by the original
law to consist of “[n]o less than 60% of the total area of the district . . . which has been
plotted and developed.”28 These provisions stand in stark contrast to the current law,
which merely requires that 25% of the area in a district “[m]ust be a blighted area; [m]ust
be in need of rehabilitation, redevelopment or conservation work . . . ; or [m]ust be
suitable for commercial or arts district uses.”29
B. Current Statutes and Rules
Chapter 206 of Title 30-A of the Maine Revised Statutes lays out the statutory
basis for tax increment financing and authorizes municipalities to designate
development districts (“TIF districts”) within their boundaries.30 The Department of
Economic and Community Development (“DECD”) is the agency tasked with
regulating and approving TIF programs. 31 Before creating a TIF district, a
municipality’s legislative body “must consider whether the proposed district or
program will contribute to the economic growth or well-being of the municipality . .
. or to the betterment of the health, welfare or safety of the inhabitants of the
municipality.”32 “At least 25%” of the area to be designated as a TIF district “must
be a blighted area; must be in need of rehabilitation, redevelopment or conservation
work . . . ; or must be suitable for commercial or arts district uses.”33 The area of the
TIF district “may not exceed 2% of the total acreage of the municipality,” and the
total area of all TIF districts “may not exceed 5%” of a municipality’s total acreage.34

25

Id.
See Public Laws of the State of Maine, ch. 397, 546 (1977).
27
Id. § 4861 (emphasis added).
28
Id. § 4863.
29
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5223(3) (2011 & Supp. 2016). It is hard to imagine a potential
TIF district which would not have at least 25% which meets one of these criteria.
30
Id. § 5223(1).
31
See id. § 5226(2) (stating the DECD commissioner shall review TIF proposals to ensure statutory
compliance); see also id. § 5229 (giving the DECD commissioner the authority to promulgate rules for
TIF district designation).
32
Id. § 5223(2).
33
Id. § 5223(3)(A).
34
Id. § 5223(3)(B).
26
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A TIF arrangement may last no longer than thirty tax years. 35
A municipality must have a development plan for each TIF district, which
should include, among other things, a financial plan and a description of what is
going to be financed through the program; the requirements for the plan are laid out
explicitly in the statute.36 The financial plan must lay out the cost estimates, amount
of public indebtedness to be incurred (if the town will use the TIF revenue to secure
a municipal bond), and a description of the terms and conditions of any related
agreements or contracts.37 The municipality may only spend the TIF district money
according to the financial plan.38 Interestingly, as part of their financial plans,
municipalities are also required to calculate the tax shifts or how their TIF will affect
county taxes, state revenue sharing, and school budgets.39 None of those calculations
will impact the state’s approval of the TIF, which suggests that such a requirement
is merely a way for the legislature to gather data and encourage municipalities to
consider the impact of the TIF arrangement. 40
TIF revenues may only be spent on authorized project costs. 41 Table A gives
non-exhaustive examples of project costs which are specifically authorized by
statute.42 The statute provides three general categories of acceptable project costs; it
is worth noting that any costs outside of the TIF district which are not economic
development costs must be substantially related to the district to qualify. 43 DECD
notes in its TIF manual that it may approve project costs which are not specifically
enumerated if they are consistent with the legislative purpose to create and retain
jobs and broaden the tax base.44

35

Id. § 5224(2)(H).
Id. § 5224(2).
37
Id. § 5224(3).
38
Id. § 5224(5).
39
Id. § 5224(4).
40
See id. §§ 5221-5235 (showing that no part of the TIF approval process depends on the outcomes
of tax shift calculations).
41
Id. § 5225 (2011 & Supp. 2016).
42
Id.
43
Id. § 5225(B) (2011 & Supp. 2016).
44
Department of Economic and Community Development, Municipal Tax Increment Financing, at
10 (Feb. 2010) [hereinafter TIF Manual].
36
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Table A: Authorized Project Costs Examples
Costs Within TIF
District
x
x

x
x

acquisition of
land
construction of
buildings,
structures, and
public fixtures
transit
development
signs and railing

Costs Outside TIF
District
x
x
x

sewage and
water treatment
facilities
costs of public
safety
improvements
mitigation of
adverse impact
of district

Other Costs
x
x
x
x
x

economic
development
environmental
improvements
skill development
and training
quality child care
recreational trails

The most common form of TIF arrangement in Maine is called a credit
enhancement agreement (“CEA”); out of the 380 active TIF districts in the state, 207
involve CEAs.45 A CEA is essentially a contract between a municipality and a
company to set aside “all, or a percentage of, the tax revenues generated by the new
investment to pay certain authorized project costs with payments made directly to
the company.”46 DECD lists several advantages of CEAs, the foremost of which is
that they are far less risky than issuing municipal bonds to fund TIF projects.47 Other
advantages include the ability to use a CEA to provide direct incentives to
businesses, the fact that they are generally easier to garner public support for than
municipal bonds, and that they provide flexibility throughout the life of the TIF
district.48 A large disadvantage is that the amount of revenue generated by a CEA is
directly tied to the amount of new investment within a district. 49
The other form of TIF arrangement involves a municipality issuing general
obligation bonds which are then repaid through TIF revenue. 50 The advantage of this
style of TIF arrangement is that it provides quicker access to the money necessary to
complete projects within the TIF district and that it fixes a municipality’s obligation
for a specific amount and term.51 The glaring disadvantage, according to DECD, is
that issuing municipal debt creates a great deal of risk exposure because the
municipality will continue to be obligated to pay back the debt even if the TIF
revenues decline.52
C. Delogu v. State: Maine’s TIF Laws Survive a Constitutional Challenge
The only real challenge to Maine’s TIF laws came in the 1998 case Delogu v.
45
Aaron Twombly, TIF: Positive Development or Tax Giveaway?, WCSH 6 (Nov. 7, 2016),
http://www.wcsh6.com/news/local/tif-positive-development-or-tax-giveaway-/349576520
[https://perma.cc/H4FC-MS9X].
46
TIF Manual, supra note 44, at 6-7.
47
Id. at 7.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
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State, in which taxpayers brought an action which claimed, among other things, that
a TIF arrangement and the resulting credit enhancement agreement between the City
of Bath and the ship manufacturer Bath Iron Works (“BIW”) violated the equal
assessment requirement of the Maine Constitution and was not authorized by the TIF
legislation.53 Under the TIF’s credit enhancement agreement, Bath would reimburse
BIW $85 million that came from an increase in value due to an expansion. 54
The Maine Constitution states that “[a]ll taxes upon real and personal estate,
assessed by authority of this State, shall be apportioned and assessed equally
according to the just value thereof.” 55 The plaintiffs alleged that Bath’s
reimbursement through the credit enhancement agreement led to unequal taxation. 56
The trial court found that the TIF arrangement did not violate the equal assessment
requirement, and the Law Court affirmed, saying:
The reimbursement to BIW is a distribution of tax revenues. A critical distinction
exists between the assessment of taxes and the spending of tax revenues. As we
held in McBreairity: “Although Article IX, Section 8 requires equal assessment of
property taxes, it does not apply to the manner in which the government chooses to
spend its tax revenues. There is no requirement that the Legislature distribute tax
revenues equally.”57

As for the challenge to the statutory authority for a town to grant a credit
enhancement TIF, the trial court found that the statutes did enable such an
arrangement.58 The Law Court affirmed that decision, noting that the DECD had
“interpreted the TIF enabling legislation to allow the credit enhancement TIF.” 59
DECD’s interpretation, the Court said, was entitled to deference absent a clear
legislative intent to the contrary.60
IV. CRITICISM, PRAISE, AND WHETHER TIF WORKS
A. A Lot of Criticism
A criticism levied nearly constantly at TIF programs in Maine and other states
is that such arrangements amount to little more than public subsidies of private
businesses. University of Maine School of Law Professor Emeritus Orlando Delogu
is a critic of TIF districts that rebate directly to businesses. 61 “Once you’re not
talking infrastructure,” he says, “you’re talking corporate subsidy.” 62 Early TIFs
focused on infrastructure improvements, which Delogu says “benefit industry and
society and the public will own it. It’s the sort of improvement that municipal
53

1998 ME 246, ¶ 8, 720 A.2d 1153, 1155.
Id. at ¶ 6, 1154.
55
ME. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
56
Delogu, 1998 ME 246, ¶ 8, 720 A.2d at 1155.
57
Id. ¶ 18, 720 A.2d at 1156.
58
Id. ¶ 24, 720 A.2d at 1157.
59
Id. ¶ 21, 720 A.2d at 1157.
60
Id.
61
See Naomi Schalit, Maine’s TIF Law Lets Businesses Avoid Paying for Local Services, Schools,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/02/19/maines-tif-lawallows-businesses-to-avoid-paying-for-local-services-schools/ [https://perma.cc/8GW7-K4ZR].
62
Twombly, supra note 45.
54
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government was created to put in place.”63
Journalist Naomi Schalit points to an early TIF in Auburn to show the focus on
infrastructure.64 In 1984 the City of Auburn created a TIF in which the captured
revenue paid off a municipal bond used to extend the public sewer to a desirable
commercial area near a highway.65 In stark contrast, Schalit then points to a TIF in
Millinocket created in 2001 with a paper company. 66 In that case, the mill agreed to
keep a certain amount of workers employed at the mill and in return would receive
nearly $2 million back through the TIF.67 After failing to keep the agreed-upon
number of workers, the mill was still able to petition the town and keep the TIF. 68
A 2011 study on TIF that Schalit quotes in her article shows that this perceived
over-eagerness of municipalities to enter into TIFs is not solely a Maine
phenomenon:
The failure to restrict TIF to appropriate settings and to impose sufficient public
oversight and budgeting rules over TIF funds have allowed what should be a
mundane tax policy to instead become a temptation that too many municipal
officials find themselves unable to resist—an immediate infusion of cash that often
comes with little consideration of long-term costs. Egged on by developers eager
for subsidies, cities have pushed the boundaries of TIF far beyond what common
sense or good policy would dictate.69

Further adding to the pressure municipalities face is that businesses have the upper
hand in negotiating, with companies often creating bidding wars between
neighboring towns and exploiting municipal officials’ lack of technical expertise. 70
“The thing is, if you deny them, they make the threat of going down the street to
another town,” says Frenchville town manager John Davis. 71 According to Delogu,
“[t]he TIF granting towns are in this competition where they win the more they give
away.”72
In fact, this trend might trace its roots to the expansion of TIF away from
blighted urban areas. Such expanded eligibility has certainly increased the use of
TIF and “[i]n Maine, any district in which 70 percent of the land is zoned for
commercial or industrial use is eligible for TIF.”73 The “lack of clear criteria to guide
the use of TIF” leads to inexpert municipalities fighting against each other to the
detriment of the public and existing businesses.74
Adding fuel to the fire is something that Professor Briffault describes as
“interlocal conflict,” which is the conflict between municipalities that share authority

63

Schalit, supra note 61.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Rob Kerth & Phineas Baxandall, Tax Increment Financing: The Need for Increased Transparency
and Accountability in Local Economic Development Subsidies, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, 4 (Fall 2011).
70
Id. at 10.
71
Schalit, supra note 61.
72
Twombly, supra note 45.
73
Kerth, supra note 69, at 11.
74
Id.
64
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over entities such as counties and school districts. 75 This conflict occurs because
“[i]n a substantial majority of states, the city that adopts a TIF program may commit
to it the incremental property tax revenues that would have gone to overlapping
governments, such as school districts.”76 Indeed, to add insult to injury, if a town
loses a TIF agreement to a neighboring town, because of the way county budgets,
revenue sharing, and school budgets operate, they may end up subsidizing the other
town’s TIF.77
Maine’s TIF laws have received criticism as being a method “for municipalities
to underwrite revenues so that they can receive more funds from the state.” 78 This is
because TIF shields new values and the resulting revenues that stem from within the
district. State revenue sharing “depends on how much revenue a town produces”79
and, under Maine’s ad valorem tax system, revenue is intrinsically tied with the
overall assessed value of all the properties in town. Some argue that this essentially
forces less savvy towns to subsidize the more successful towns, which tend to be
larger and have less actual need for economic incentives to attract business.80 The
obvious response from TIF proponents would be that these problems stem from
revenue sharing and not from TIFs, and that any town can create a TIF. 81 Schalit
argues, however, that TIFs have a disproportionate impact because “it’s mostly urban
towns or mill towns that have TIFs in Maine—thus shifting the burden to mostly
rural communities,” which are unlikely to have the need or the resources to create
TIFs.82
B. Some Praise and Widespread Endorsement Through Use
TIF in Maine and throughout the country is certainly not without its proponents,
which is clear from the widespread adoption of TIF laws and programs. In a sense,
the extensive use of TIF speaks for itself, which may explain the lack of editorializing
on its benefits; clearly many municipalities and businesses view it positively.
Responding to Schalit’s two-part series highlighting the criticisms of TIFs in Maine,
Andrew Hamilton and John Porter, both members of the Bangor Region Chamber of
Commerce, were disappointed that “there [was] little or no acknowledgment that
TIFs have made the difference in many critical economic development projects in
Maine.”83 They highlight the importance of TIF projects such as the General Electric
75

Briffault, supra note 5, at 88.
Id.
77
Id.
78
Michael Havlin, Maine Voices: TIF Helps Communities That Don’t Need It, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (May 26, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/05/26/tif-helps-communities-that-dontneed-it_2013-05-26/ [https://perma.cc/PTS5-CYQP].
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Naomi Schalit, Maine Tax ‘Game’ Allows Towns to Protect State Aid at Expense of Neighbors,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/02/20/maine-tax-gameallows-some-towns-to-protect-their-state-aid-at-expense-of-other-towns/ [https://perma.cc/7AZX-8TF2].
82
Id.
83
Andrew Hamilton & John Porter, Don’t Forget, Tax Increment Financing Deals Can Make the
DAILY
NEWS
(Feb.
26,
2014),
Difference
in
Attracting
Business,
BANGOR
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/02/26/opinion/dont-forget-tax-increment-financing-deals-can-makethe-difference-in-attracting-business/ [https://perma.cc/D55Y-J5ZT].
76
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plant in Bangor or the Texas Instrument plant in South Portland.84 They dismiss
Schalit’s argument that TIFs force other municipalities to subsidize the arrangement
by pointing out that “often projects undertaken with TIF benefit whole regions, not
just one community.”85 They also reject Schalit’s depiction of TIF “as a program
run amok,” countering with the procedural safeguards that limit the amount of
property a municipality can place into a TIF district.86
C. Unanswered Questions
As ubiquitous as TIF is in this country, there is a surprising dearth of research
on how effective it is at growing local economies. Amongst the relatively small pool
of researchers who have examined the issue, there is little consensus whether the net
impact of TIF arrangements is positive, negative, or neutral.87 Indeed, there is an
almost call-and-response like pattern of conclusions with one study finding one way
while a later study finds the other way and criticizes the methods of the first study. 88
Professors Richard Dye and David Merriman have conducted two prominent
studies89 of the economic impact of TIF in Illinois, concluding that:
Tax increment financing is an alluring tool. TIF districts grow much faster than
other areas in their host municipalities. TIF boosters or naive analysts might point
to this as evidence of the success of tax increment financing, but they would be
wrong. Observing high growth in an area targeted for development is unremarkable.
The issues we have studied are (1) whether the targeting causes the growth or merely
signals that growth is coming; and (2) whether the growth in the targeted area comes
at the expense of other parts of the same municipality. We find evidence that the
non-TIF areas of municipalities that use TIF grow no more rapidly, and perhaps
more slowly, than similar municipalities that do not use TIF . . . . Our evidence
[also] shows that commercial TIF districts reduce commercial property value
growth in the non-TIF part of the same municipality.90

Dye and Merriman urge policymakers to use caution when developing TIF, because
“[i]t is . . . merely a way of financing economic development and does not change
the opportunities for development or the skills of those doing the development
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planning.”91
Professor Joyce Man, on the other hand, is skeptical of Dye and Merriman’s
conclusions.92 In her own research focusing on TIF in Indiana, Man has reached
much more positive conclusions, such as that “TIF programs have increased the
median owner-occupied housing value by 11.4 percent in the TIF-adopting cities
relative to what it would have been without the program.” 93 She has also found that
“TIF programs have a statistically significant positive impact on local employment
[and] . . . that the targeted public investment in a TIF district yields a substantial
positive impact on economic activity.”94 “TIF,” she says, “is an effective local
economic development tool.”95 Man is not alone in her conclusions, as other earlier
studies have also shown that “TIF projects do stimulate economic development.” 96
A 1993 study that surveyed 300 municipalities found that “78 percent of [the cities
using TIF] experienced increases in property values, and only 2 percent of the
respondents actually experienced a decline in property taxes after the establishment
of the TIF district.”97
It seems that most TIF researchers would agree that there is at least a correlation
between TIF usage and increased assessed property values. The core disagreement
is the degree to which TIF is responsible for the increased values and whether its
economic benefits extend further. Second Circuit law clerk Joseph Blocher and
Professor Jonathan Morgan, in reviewing the various economic studies of TIF, have
this to say:
Many of the studies that show a positive connection between TIF and local
development have been criticized for attributing outcomes to TIF that may have
happened on their own without public investment. If a TIF-designated district
experiences major growth, there is a tendency to credit that growth to whatever
investments the city or county made as part of its development plan. However, it is
entirely possible that TIF did nothing but “capture” the natural growth that would
have occurred without it.98

Similarly, a 2015 study on the impact of TIF in Indiana found that while “TIFs are
associated with small but positive growth in assessed value,” they had “negative
impacts . . . on traditional measures of economic development such as employment,
the number of business establishments, and sales tax revenue.”99 These findings led
the authors of that study “to conclude that the Indiana TIF is not an economic
91
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development tool, but a county budget management tool.”100
Given the lack of conclusive studies nationally, it is unsurprising that there is
little information available on the efficacy of Maine’s TIF programs. In 1999, Marc
Breslow, PhD, analyzed six major economic development programs, including TIF,
in Maine to determine their impact on employment. 101 Using data from 1998, he
found that when TIF is isolated it “actually seems to be associated with a loss of jobs.
This is of particular concern since the TIF program has been expanding rapidly—
from 37 districts in 1993 to about 120 in 1999—and its annual cost is expected to
rise to $15 million by 2001.”102 A 2001 report by the Bureau of Labor Education at
the University of Maine summarized the trend:
[R]ecent state data indicate that while the amount of municipal TIF dollars going
toward infrastructure has been increasing slowly since 1995, the TIF dollars
returned directly to corporations has increased far more rapidly; from $1.8 million
in 1995 to 18.7 million in 1998—an increase of 1,039 percent in only five years.103

Breslow also notes that the limited employment data from companies makes it
“impossible to determine when or if tax breaks [such as TIF] actually create new
jobs, as opposed to subsidizing jobs that would have been created without taxpayer
assistance.”104
V. DISCUSSION
There are both advantages and disadvantages to the use of TIF, but they have
proven difficult to measure with any degree of certainty. The following arguments
are made with the presumption that the impact of TIF in Maine and the rest of the
country remains opaque. An obvious solution, therefore, would be for the Maine
legislature to gather more data about the impact of TIF on economic growth both at
a local and state level; armed with clearer data it would be much easier to perform a
cost/benefit analysis of the program as a whole. However, even without such
analysis it is clear there are areas of the law which can be improved and steps
municipalities can take to ensure the program is actually producing positive results.
This section will make the following recommendations: (1) TIF laws should
limit reimbursements to private developers; (2) the maximum time period a TIF
arrangement can exist should be shortened; (3) businesses benefiting from TIF
arrangements should be held to concrete standards; and (4) the negative impact that
one municipality’s TIF arrangement has on neighboring communities should be
100
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mitigated as much as possible. Finally, this section discusses how smaller
municipalities can avoid the “race to give away the most” absent major legislative
changes.
A. Limit Reimbursements to Developers
As previously discussed, TIF as a concept was intended to entice developers into
building businesses in areas they might have otherwise avoided due to conditions
such as narrow streets, worn out buildings, or lack of public utilities, that might fall
under the umbrella of the term “blight.”105 Using TIF as a de facto property tax
abatement by refunding taxes to offset private development costs obfuscates what
should be a relatively simple idea. It makes sense when a municipality, after
identifying an area that needs infrastructure improvements in order to attract new
businesses, designates the taxes from the ensuing new development to offset the costs
of installing that infrastructure. It makes far less sense for a municipality to make a
deal with a single business to reimburse property tax revenue in exchange for abstract
assurances of new jobs and economic growth.
The simplest way to alleviate concerns that TIF is too often being used to
subsidize private business (rather than merely encouraging it) is to limit the
percentage of tax dollars that a municipality may reimburse developers. Extending
a public sewer system or widening a road with TIF results in tangible and long-term
benefits for an entire community even if such improvements serve only a single
business initially. Reimbursements, on the other hand, have much murkier benefits
and raise questions about the long-term viability of a project if it is truly operating
on such a slim margin (e.g., even TIF could not save the paper mill discussed above).
Most municipalities would likely prefer to limit their use of TIF to infrastructure
improvements (or other costs outside the private development itself), but because of
the intense competition for new business feel obligated to offer as much of a
reimbursement as possible.
Limiting reimbursements or restricting the use of TIF funds at the state level to
costs external to the private business would be a simple way to ensure that
communities in Maine are less inclined to engage in what Professor Delogu would
describe as a race to give the most away.106 Returning to the Littleton hypothetical,
BigMart would be less inclined to pit towns against each other if it knew that no town
105
See discussion supra Section II.A. It is also worth mentioning that the term “blight” has been
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could reimburse its tax dollars to offset the cost of constructing its store. It might
ask Littleton to earmark TIF funds for new sidewalks to the store or to create job
training programs, but those expenditures fall on the concrete/tangible side of the
benefit spectrum. These benefits will remain with the community regardless of
whether BigMart is successful.
B. Reasons for Shorter TIF Arrangements
Under current Maine law, a municipality may enter into a TIF agreement for as
long as thirty years. This raises concerns because economic conditions, both at a
community level and nationally, will likely fluctuate through several boom and bust
periods over the course of thirty years and a town’s economic standing will almost
certainly change significantly even by the halfway point of such a lengthy
arrangement. Although it is not unusual for municipalities to make decisions that
will have long-term impacts, given the uncertain benefits of TIF, shortening the
amount of time a TIF can exist would be a simple way to prevent towns from entering
into shortsighted TIF agreements in their haste to attract new business. A TIF
agreement may initially appear beneficial, but later become less favorable due to
changing economic circumstances; a shorter time limit would reduce the risk of
unforeseen changes and mitigate the effect of such changes.
When considering an ideal time-frame it is necessary to weigh the benefits of
longer TIF agreements against the benefits of shorter agreements. One key benefit
of longer agreements is that they better enable a community to make efficient use of
municipal bonds by giving the municipality a longer period of time to pay off the
debt.107 As Johnson wrote in 2001:
Twenty-four states have . . . set[] maximum time limits for . . . the use of TIF by an
authority. There is a great amount of variation in the number of years one can use
TIF financing for a specific project. For example, California places an effective
thirty-year time limit on projects. Contrasted with this very liberal policy, New
Mexico places strict five-year (ten years for projects initiated under the metropolitan
redevelopment provisions of the statutes) time limits on the tax increment financing
method. Under this restriction, the redevelopment area can live on perpetually, but
the tax increment is restricted. This may act to focus effort early in the development
undertaking, but may preclude efficient use of debt financing.108

Indeed, it is a central tenet of TIF that “TIF districts must be . . . temporary . . . with
a defined time limit at which point the property’s tax revenue will once again be used
for general public purposes.”109 The lengthier a TIF is, the further it strays from its
original purpose as a temporary corrective measure intended to rehabilitate an area,
and the more it becomes a corporate subsidy.
107
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108
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Weighing these considerations, it seems like a time limit between fifteen and
twenty years would be the appropriate compromise. Such a time limit would still
enable municipalities to effectively use debt financing or to earmark funds for certain
large infrastructure projects. Although towns currently have the option of entering
shorter term TIF arrangements, given the competition between towns, a company
seeking a TIF (which appears to be the most common scenario, at least in Maine)
can shop around for thirty years.
C. Addressing the Need to Mitigate Impact on Surrounding Communities by
Narrowing the Scope of TIF Projects
As discussed above, one of the biggest criticisms of TIF is that it affects more
than just the TIF-adopting community. This is because of the way school and county
budgets work and, in Maine particularly, the way that state revenue-sharing
functions. Because the tax revenues from TIF districts are shielded from these
calculations, surrounding towns and the state as a whole can end up paying more to
a municipality while reaping little to no benefit from the TIF.
Professor George Lefcoe has identified several ways that states have attempted
to protect school and county budgets from the TIF decisions of individual
municipalities:
(1) A few states authorize payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) to schools, counties
and other taxing entities. PILOTs never fully replace revenues lost to TIF.
Some states make up all or most of the local school district revenue loss due to
TIF by the formulas they use to distribute state funding for schools.
(2) Generally, the schools, counties or other districts receive notice of proposed
TIF-funded projects that would divert revenues from schools and the
opportunity to comment.
(3) In some states, school districts and counties take a seat on a TIF joint review
board.
(4) In Florida, Kentucky, and New York, school districts are barred from
contributing any of their property taxes.
(5) A handful of states allow schools, counties, and other taxing entities the choice
of opting in or out of sharing their tax increments for any particular
redevelopment or economic development plan.110

The concern, however, with giving other entities power over a municipality’s ability
to enter TIF agreements is that instead of making the process fairer, they might abuse
their power to achieve their own ends.111 It is easy to imagine how involving schools
and counties would muddy the waters and bring the already complex TIF process to
a complete standstill.
It would significantly undermine TIF to force municipalities to pay their share
of the school and county budgets based on the value of a TIF district because doing
so would leave very little money. School budgets are almost universally the biggest
portion of any municipality’s expenditures and would eat up a large chunk of the
revenue that a TIF district generates, which in turn would lessen the ability of the
110
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municipality to obtain debt financing or undertake large infrastructure projects.
Without severely undercutting TIF programs, it is nearly impossible to completely
mitigate the impact that such programs have outside the granting municipality.
Because of this inherent subsidization, the better solution is to limit the
parameters of properties that can qualify for TIF. If TIF districts met the but-for test
(but for the subsidization there would be no new development) and had to show
actual economic benefits (e.g., new jobs, increased tourism, etc.), the inherent
subsidization would be a much easier pill to swallow for the surrounding towns. As
it is, however, TIF districts are often used in greenfield development for new
businesses or expansion of existing businesses—often in communities where such
development would have occurred anyway even without the incentive. Without
making the process much more complicated, municipalities have little incentive to
consider the impact of a TIF arrangement on surrounding communities and should
therefore be more limited in their use. By forcing companies to satisfy the but-for
test and meet certain requirements (discussed below), there is a much greater
likelihood a TIF arrangement will actually benefit an entire region as its proponents
claim.112
D. Leveraging TIF to Achieve Specific Goals
In the fall of 2016 the Portland City Council approved a twelve year TIF for an
expansion of the biotechnology firm ImmuCell.113 The chairman of the Economic
Development Committee “said the tax break was the only incentive [Portland] could
offer to keep the company in Maine. Most of its business is in the Midwest.” 114
Mayor Ethan Strimling opposed the TIF because he “didn’t think that ImmuCell truly
needed the public funds to move forward with the project.” 115 Before he voted to
deny the TIF,
Strimling made a last-minute attempt . . . to set conditions on the agreement that
would have imposed new rules for building contractors [working on the ImmuCell
expansion] . . . . The new rules would have required that 25 percent of the work
hours be performed by Portland residents and another 25 percent by ethnic
minorities, women, veterans and disabled, economically disadvantaged or LGBT
workers. They would also have required that all workers be paid wages and benefits
which meet or exceed the Maine Department of Labor’s “prevailing wage” rates for
their professions and that contractors participate in a state- or federally-approved
apprenticeship program for all relevant trades.116

Although Strimling failed to get the conditions he wanted, his idea of putting
certain conditions on the use of TIF is an idea that other municipalities can and
should emulate. It is an option that falls under the old adage, “if you can’t beat them,
join them.” Of course, as the largest city in Maine, Portland enjoys both better
112
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bargaining power and more resources to negotiate TIF conditions than a small rural
town like Littleton. It might make sense, therefore, to include certain criteria within
the TIF statutes as conditions for all future TIF arrangements. Such criteria could
focus first on ensuring that any development uses local labor and builds in an
environmentally responsible way. It could also require an actual showing (not
merely an estimation) by the benefiting company that the development has added
and maintained a certain amount of new jobs (a formula could be developed that
requires a certain amount of jobs for different levels of reimbursement).
In 1998, Breslow found when analyzing economic development programs that
programs with specific employment performance standards “had much better results
in terms of employment and cost per job [added] than the . . . programs without
standards [like TIF].”117 The programs with standards “require that in order to
receive funds a company must be hiring new workers, or show that training is needed
in order to retain workers.”118 The data showed that the program with the weakest
standards had the highest cost per job added of all of the programs with standards,
which suggests a correlation.119
The Bureau of Labor Education had the following recommendation for
economic development programs like TIF:
The state needs to develop and implement additional mechanisms to ensure
corporate accountability. These mechanisms must be effective and enforceable.
Rather than simply hoping that our public resources will be used wisely and
effectively, every business receiving a corporate tax incentive or any other economic
development resources from the state should be required to account for how those
resources were used, and how many permanent quality jobs were created, at
appropriate levels of pay and benefits. If a company does not follow through on its
promises or obligations, and instead uses public resources to lay off workers or
reduce its employment, it should return any development incentives or tax breaks
back to the state coffers.120

Such conditions, if made a statutory requirement, are an obvious solution to the
dilemma of trying to measure the success of TIF districts in creating and maintaining
employment opportunities for Mainers. Rather than argue in the abstract, by setting
measurable conditions it will be easy for any municipality, large or small, to hold
TIF-benefiting companies accountable. By creating a mechanism whereby
companies would either be forced to return money or no longer qualify to receive
TIF money if they significantly reduce their workforce, it would incentivize
companies to maintain jobs.
Although companies are likely to oppose such restrictions and conditions
on the use of TIF, the addition of employment standards would recognize the
partnership element of credit enhancement TIF arrangements. The standards
reallocate some of the risk that was previously almost entirely on the TIF-granting
municipality onto the benefiting private business and give the municipality at least
some say in how their investment is used. The administrative costs of ensuring
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compliance with the conditions would be relatively low because the state already has
mechanisms in place that track jobs (e.g., state income taxes).
To further recognize the business partner-like relationship between
municipalities and the businesses in TIF districts, there should be strict reporting
requirements for the information from TIF projects that should be readily available
to anyone. For an area of municipal law that has such a large impact on both local
and state budgets, TIF is not well understood by the general public and this issue is
exacerbated by the dearth of readily accessible information about (a) which
companies receive TIF benefits and (b) how much those benefits are. A new TIF
arrangement may make the news when it is first discussed and approved, but if it
lasts thirty years it will likely fall off the radar of anyone who does not work in city
hall. Residents of municipalities should be able to easily track how much value is
captured by TIF districts in their community and how that money is spent
(particularly if it is spent on reimbursements to developers). A well-informed public,
armed with the knowledge that a local business has a thirty-year TIF agreement that
reimburses most of the tax amount back to that business, will be a good watchdog
for any actions that could be viewed as the business taking advantage of the TIF
funds it receives (e.g., laying off workers). The court of public opinion is a strong
tool in and of itself.
E. What Smaller Towns can do Right Now
Changing Maine’s TIF laws will not be a fast process if it happens at all. Even
if some of the suggested reforms are adopted, smaller, more rural Maine towns will
continue to face challenges that are different from those faced by urban areas like
Portland. Towns like Littleton will always have to account for disparate bargaining
power and limited resources when deciding whether to create a TIF district, but that
is not to say they are completely powerless. This section will discuss steps and
suggestions that any municipality can follow to better use TIF as it exists today.
The first thing any municipality should do is to create and adopt a TIF policy.
Ideally this policy would exist before any TIF districts are created, but at any juncture
in the process, whether a town is anticipating its first TIF district or creating its
twentieth district, it is worth taking a serious look at how to best utilize TIF within a
community. Even communities that do not expect to utilize TIF should preemptively
examine their positions so they are not caught off guard when a business approaches
them with a proposal. Things to include in the plan are the town’s overall economic
development goals, whether the town will deal with individualized TIF districts, and
what percentage (if any) the town is willing to reimburse to businesses to offset
development costs.
Portland made significant revisions to its TIF policy in 2013, which resulted in
a policy that:
[P]laces a greater emphasis on neighborhood-wide redevelopment zones, meaning
the city would invest that money on area infrastructure improvements, such as
roadways, sidewalks and utilities. The city could still grant property-specific TIFs,
but there would be limits. Developers would be allowed to get back a maximum of
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65 percent of property taxes from new development over 20 years. 121

While small towns may not be able to create a TIF policy as comprehensive as
Portland’s, creating a policy that addresses the big issues discussed above would at
the very least serve as a framework through which to build a better TIF district should
the issue arise.
Maine municipalities should also consider the various ways they might leverage
a TIF agreement to achieve specific goals such as job growth. The conditions to ask
for will depend on a variety of factors, but even conditions like using local labor to
construct new buildings within a TIF district are small concessions on the business’s
part that will have concrete benefits in the local community. Further, if a business
wants a long term TIF arrangement that results in a lot of the captured value being
reimbursed to it, it is worth trying at least to condition the TIF on a certain level of
new jobs and/or continued employment opportunities. If a business is particularly
motivated, it may be worth including a claw back provision which would require a
company that has not met its end of the bargain to pay back the money it has received
through the arrangement.
Of course, a municipality’s ability to set conditions on TIF arrangements is
significantly limited by the fierce competition between towns for new development.
One non-legislative way to combat this competition is to create binding regional
pacts that establish a TIF policy for a whole region. For example, if eight towns
within a particular region got together and agreed to only accept TIF arrangements
that met certain criteria, it would increase their ability to bargain with businesses
similar to BigMart that want to locate in a general area, but are willing to shop around
for the best TIF arrangement. Because such an agreement might encourage some
towns to hold out and offer more favorable terms, it will be incumbent upon the
sponsoring towns to clearly explain the benefits of increased bargaining power and
the pitfalls of overly generous TIF arrangements.
Finally, municipalities should be wary of situations, similar to what Portland
faced with ImmuCell, where an existing business explicitly or implicitly threatens to
leave a municipality if a favorable TIF arrangement is not reached. While there may
be legitimate reasons to help an existing business with an expansion, municipalities
should carefully verify that the business actually needs the money that would be
reimbursed and is not simply using TIF to strategically lower the costs of an
expansion that would have occurred anyway. If such a business is unwilling to
cooperate in reaching a mutually beneficial agreement, the municipality should walk
away from the negotiating table.
VI. CONCLUSION
The criticisms of TIF and the struggles Maine municipalities face when using it
and other economic development incentives are part of a larger debate about the role
121
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that government should play in subsidizing private development. When General
Motors experienced an existential crisis during the 2008 recession, the New York
Times noted:
In the end, the money that towns across America gave General Motors did not
matter. When the automaker released a list of factories it was closing during
bankruptcy . . . , communities that had considered themselves G.M.’s business
partners were among the targets. For years, mayors and governors anxious about
local jobs had agreed to G.M.’s demands for cash rewards, free buildings, worker
training and lucrative tax breaks. As late as 2007, the company was telling local
officials that these sorts of incentives would “further G.M.’s strong relationship”
with them and be a “win/win situation,” according to town council notes from one
Michigan community. Yet at least 50 properties on the 2009 liquidation list were in
towns and states that had awarded incentives, adding up to billions in taxpayer
dollars . . . .122

Businesses, the Times said, have expertly capitalized on Americans’ economic fears:
A portrait arises of mayors and governors who are desperate to create jobs,
outmatched by multinational corporations and short on tools to fact-check what
companies tell them. Many of the officials said they feared that companies would
move jobs overseas if they did not get subsidies in the United States. Over the years,
corporations have increasingly exploited that fear, creating a high-stakes bazaar
where they pit local officials against one another to get the most lucrative packages.
States compete with other states, cities compete with surrounding suburbs, and even
small towns have entered the race with the goal of defeating their neighbors. While
some jobs have certainly migrated overseas, many companies receiving incentives
were not considering leaving the country, according to interviews and incentive
data.123

Maine, both at the municipal and state levels, should seek to avoid being played
for a fool when doling out economic development programs like TIF. It can do this
by setting mandatory standards and limiting spending to things such as infrastructure
and education, which have more universal benefits than rebates to private developers.
Incentives that target specific businesses risk falling into the buzzword category of
“crony capitalism” and raise questions of whether it is fair for the state to subsidize
some businesses, but not others. Any substantial economic development reform
should account for the aforementioned problems and avoid setting off races to give
away tax dollars for questionable returns.
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